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The Senility of Group Solidarity and Contemporary 





Even if an individual tribe has different “houses” and 
many diverse group feelings, still, there must exist a 
group feeling that is stronger than all the other 
group feelings combined, [...] and in which all the 
diverse group feeling coalesce, as it were, to become 
one greater group feeling. Otherwise, splits would 
occur and lead to dissension and strife. 
 
—Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah III, 16 
 
Abstract. This paper discusses the thought of the medieval Andalusian-Maghrebin thinker Ibn 
Khaldun through the prism of the philosophy and sociology of law and politics. I will first try 
to illustrate how, even if Ibn Khaldun wrote in the 14th century, he anticipated many core 
concepts that are characteristic of modern Western sociological and philosophical thought. 
The argument is thus made that his thought can, and indeed must, be rescued from the wide 
neglect that, outside the specialized field of Khaldunian studies, it has so far suffered in our 
treatment and teaching of the history of politico-legal sociological thought. I will then claim 
that the scheme he devised to explain the rise and fall of civilizations can also, with due care, 
be used to frame and understand the political and cultural landscape in which the West and 
the Islamic world are presently engaged in a difficult dialogue. The discussion is in this sense 
offered in the hope of making a contribution to the current politico-legal philosophical and 





In this essay I illustrate two salient features of a conception at once 
philosophical, sociological, and political that in the 14th century was 
developed by Ibn Khaldun. For about a century now he has increasingly been 
attracting the interest of philosophers, historians, sociologists, 
anthropologists, and politicians, especially in the West. For as much as he is 
properly described as an Islamic thinker, this Andalusian-Maghrebin thinker 
has anticipated certain core concepts that are characteristic to Western 
 
 
1 This paper has been written as a contribution to the PRIN project “Soggetti di diritto e 
vulnerabilità: Modelli istituzionali e concetti giuridici in trasformazione.” 
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thought—concepts classically associated with the work of Montesquieu,2 
Vico,3 Marx,4 Weber,5 Durkheim,6 Oppenheimer,7 and others. 
Beyond pointing out the interest this thinker sparks, and the need to give 
him his due place in the current expositions of the history of political-legal 
sociological thought, I will be focusing on the scheme he devised for 
explaining the rise and fall of civilizations, proposing it as particularly useful 
even today in framing and understanding the current political and cultural 
landscape that in a difficult dialogue is now engaging the two sides in 
question: the West, and that very Islamic world that almost seven centuries 
ago was home to Ibn Khaldun. 
In delving into his thought, we will not be looking through the prism of the 
Arabist or the historian of Islam or of Muslim thought. Rather, we will be 
approaching the subject with an interest in the philosophy and sociology of 
law and politics, from a vantage point that will enable us to pick out the 
universalizable parts of this theory which can still be found to hold good even 
today, so as to see whether the insights they offer can be brought to bear on 




2. Cultures in Comparison 
 
Today more than at any previous time—with politics and law following a path 
of growing internationalization, and the long wave of migration showing its 
full impact—we are increasingly witnessing a blurring of the distinction 
 
 
2 Like Montesquieu, Ibn Khaldun proceeds in his theorizing from the premise that man’s 
character, attitudes, and abilities are the product of the environment and of habits steeped in 
the social culture. This explains why one of his first Western commentators, Joseph von 
Hammer-Purgstall, in an 1812 study called him the “Montesquieu of the Arabs” (von 
Hammer-Purgstall 1812, 360). 
3 Ibn Khaldun’s account of historic cycles bears a clear resemblance to Vico’s, even though in 
place of Vico’s “providence” we find in Ibn Khaldun the idea of an intrinsic law of social 
development. On this point, see in particular Ben Salem 1973; Gumplowicz 1899–1928, 90–
114; and Soyer and Gilbert 2012. 
4 Like Marx, Ibn Khaldun underlines the key role played by the material elements—first 
among which labour and the various aspects of making a living—in explaining the passage 
from one way of life, with its core values, to another. On this question, see esp. Lacoste 1984. 
5 Like Weber, Ibn Khaldun insists from the first pages of his Muqaddimah on the importance 
of the distinction between scientific description, and moral/political evaluation. Moreover, 
he makes wide use of concepts that fall neatly within the Weberian category of ideal types. 
6 Most striking, to my mind, are the resemblances that Ibn Khaldun’s concept of asabiyya and 
its dynamic transformation in rural and urban situations bears to Durkheim’s famous 
distinction between mechanic and organic solidarity: This deep resemblance can actually be 
explained by pointing out that Durkheim was perfectly aware of Ibn Khaldun’s theory. Some 
authors have in fact suggested that Ibn Khaldun’s theory might actually have been the source 
of Durkheim’s intuition. See Gellner 1996, 202. Other important similarities lie in the two 
authors’ descriptions of the dynamic of domination and in their analysis of the cohesive role 
of religion. For an overall comparison, see, e.g., Baali 1988. 
7 See the enthusiastic appraisal of Ibn Khaldun’s theory in Oppenheimer 1922–35, vol. 2, pp. 
173ff., and vol. 4, pp. 251ff. 
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between the rule and the exception when it comes to framing the relation 
between the cultural majority and cultural minorities. 
Indeed, in Western multicultural states, different moral, political, and 
cultural traditions are intersecting, and this intersectionality is driving a deep 
wedge into the most traditional Western paradigms of justice. It is in 
particular the symbolism enmeshed in such questions that pushes them into 
the foreground, sparking the most heated debates in society on the allegiances 
that it is legitimate or right to show and uphold, as well as on their religious, 
political, and cultural reflections. 
In 1989 in France we saw the first important debate on the issue of whether 
to allow or prohibit the hijab in the classroom, a debate that climaxed into a 
“national case.”8 Then, in 1995, the “case of the crucifix” erupted in Germany,9 
with some spectacular aftershocks in Italy, when in 2003 Adel Smith, 
president of the Italian Muslim Union, launched a new crucifix case in a school 
in the Abruzzo region, and a similar and difficult case—Lautsi v. Italia—was 
brought to the European Court of Human Rights, coming to an end only in 
2011 (see Bin et al. 2004). Today, such predicaments involving matters of 
justice (and law) on a cultural basis have become almost commonplace. In the 
summer of 2016 came the polemic on whether it is legitimate to prohibit the 
burkini, and if past winters are any indication, this winter we will be witness 
to another heated exchange on whether it is appropriate to decorate 
Christmas trees in preschool. In the meantime, the English neutral-sounding 
locution season’s greetings has made its way to Italy, where it is rendered as 
auguri di stagione, and where, through its lack of connotations, it has taken 
hold as the politically correct thing to say for the winter festivities. 
But for some time now these dilemmas of justice have been crossing over 
into territory that lies well beyond the politically correct and the symbolic. In 
1982 in England, the possibility was introduced of (voluntarily) substituting 
the rulings of ordinary courts with the jurisdiction of dozens of Sharia 
Councils in controversies concerning family and neighbourhood law, while 
under the Arbitration Act 1996, a Muslim Arbitration Tribunal has jurisdiction 
over matters of commercial law (see De Angelo 2014, esp. 399–400; cf. Bano 
2012 and Bowen 2016). Likewise, an increasing push to relativize justice and 
even criminal law—a push that many welcome as a sign of progressivism and 
inclusion (see Basile 2008 and Monticelli 2003)—has materialized in the 
“cultural defences” practice, invoked and often adopted in various Western 
countries (sometimes even with paradoxical outcomes, as in the Pusceddu case 
decided on 14 March 2006 by the Landgericht Bückeburg).10 
In light of that debate, it becomes increasingly essential for the social 
sciences to gain a direct knowledge of the culture informing the conceptions of 
the good that present themselves as the main interlocutor with which to 
engage in dialogue at this historical moment. Equally essential is the need to 
engage with the culture on which basis the identity of “the other” has 
 
 
8 For a discussion that frames the case well see Galeotti 1994, and for a critical comment see 
Verza 1997. 
9 See Belvisi 2004; Caygill and Scott 1996; Denninger 1997; Gozzi 1998; Luther 1997. 
10 Case KLs 205 Js 4268/05 (107/05). See Parisi 2008. 
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historically been constructed, taking especially into account its conceptions of 
politics, power, and social order. However, if this knowledge is to be genuine 
and reliable, it will have to proceed from a reading of the works it has 
produced, a reading that will have to be as direct and firsthand as possible, 
rather than being mediated and reframed (see Verza 2012). 
From this perspective—considering that the most challenging conversation 
we face today, in the fragmented cultural landscape in which we are set, is 
probably the one with Arab-Muslim culture—I believe there is great benefit to 
be had by trying to understand a thinker who figures centrally in this culture. 
And that, as suggested, is the Tunisian thinker of Andalusian background Ibn 
Khaldun (b. Tunisi 1332, d. Cairo 1406), the father of the Muqaddimah,11 a 
masterwork of thought that, perhaps because it was so advanced in the 
modernity it expressed, remained in a latent state for centuries, engendering 
no schools of thought and no concrete theoretical applications (making 
exception for its wide use in Turkish historical and political culture, as in the 
example of Katib Çelebi), until it was rediscovered by French scholars in the 
early 19th century. And indeed—despite the growing, copious, and 
remarkably diverse scholarship devoted to Ibn Khaldun,12 and perhaps 
precisely on account of his uncanny modernity—his work still struggles to 
earn its place in classic courses on Western or world sociological or 
philosophical thought (be it general or legal). 
Precisely because Ibn Khaldun has been excluded from the ranks of the 
great thinkers—expunged like a misprint from the official narrative that takes 
us through the history of ideas and the history of the theories devoted to 
society and its forms of government—it is incumbent upon us to study his 
work and enter into conversation with him as a source of insights. Indeed, as 
long as his ideas will not be integrated into the general framework of 
theoretical thinking on government and society, there will remain an 
important gap to be closed and unfulfilled theoretical potentialities of great 
import to be explored. 
Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah provides the initial theoretical premise (and 
hence, from a socio-philosophical standpoint, the most interesting part) of a 
much longer and more complex work of history: It is the first, introductory 
volume to the seven-volume Kitab al-‘ibar, or Book of Lessons.13 
 
 
11 In 1812 a work was published in Vienna (von Hammer-Purgstall 1812) making broad 
reference to translated parts of the Muqaddimah. In 1858 the first complete edition of the 
Arab text was published in Europe by Étienne M. Quatremère (Khaldun 1858). In 1862–68 a 
complete French translation was published in three volumes in Paris by William MacGuckin 
(Khaldun 1862–68). Also important are, more recently, the translations by Vincent-Mansour 
Monteil (Khaldun 1967) and Abdesselam Cheddadi (Khaldun 2002), as well as the excellent 
English translation by Franz Rosenthal (Ibn Khaldun 1958). It is this last work that I will be 
referring to here. There is also an Italian translation of parts of the Muqaddimah by Giancarlo 
Pizzi (Khaldun 1985). 
12 In 1981 a bibliography came out already listing more than seven hundred works devoted 
to him: See pt. IV (Bibliography) in Al-Azmeh 1981, 229–324. 
13 The full title can be translated thus: “Book of lessons, record of beginnings and events in 
the history of the Arabs and the Berbers and their powerful contemporaries.” 
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The importance of directly engaging and familiarizing with this thinker is in 
part owed to the fact that his theory is a core and direct expression of Islamic 
culture—a culture that needs to be recognized as being of special import to us, 
particularly today, considering the urgency of the exchange it prompts us to 
have. In this sense, his theory is a valuable source we can turn to in trying to 
understand this culture and its internal dynamics, foundational values, and 
specificities.  
No less importantly, however, I would claim that we also have a direct stake 
in gaining an appreciation of Ibn Khaldun, this for at least two reasons. 
In the first place, his work offers a viewpoint from which to engage in self-
reflection, all the more so if we consider that—preceding the founders of 
sociology by half a millennium, and through that forma mentis which the Arabs 
call aql-naql (see Dale 2015 and Dhaouadi 2005), capable of reconciling the 
religious and the rational in thought14—he developed concepts and reflections 
that we consider to be distinctive to our scientific and rational thought. 
Indeed, he addressed a range of topics and issues including social solidarity, 
the method for scientifically investigating phenomena involving collective 
action, and the relation between society and power, between power and its 
symbols, between such symbols and the desires that may be elicited through 
the availability of luxury goods, or between these goods and the economic 
phenomenon associated with what is now known as the Laffer curve.15 
We should therefore recognize a direct interest in being able to reconstruct 
Ibn Khaldun’s theory, if only because, as noted, many of the most important 
sociological concepts we identify with our own Western tradition had in fact 
already been worked out by this monumental Maghrebin and Muslim thinker 
half a millennium earlier, and because he interestingly did so proceeding from 
an “Eastern” basis, and hence independently of the secular historico-cultural 
premises that would shape our own Enlightenment. And from this fact alone—
namely, that in his theses are developed some of the most important concepts 
later independently developed in Western culture and its sociology of politics 
and of law, which concepts we otherwise think to be peculiarly “our own”—we 
can draw the important consideration that the East and the West are not 
necessarily separated by that irreducible and essentialist cultural otherness 
 
 
14 As Mohammed al-Jabri has commented, while the “Orient” embraced the path beaten by al-
Ghazali and Ibn Sina, and thus found itself caught up in the problem of the relation between 
religion and faith, Ibn Khaldun, and indeed the Western world, instead inherited the legacy of 
Ibn Rushd, embracing a rationalism capable of keeping philosophy apart from religion: “And 
in fact, ever since Averroes, we Arabs have lived at the margins of history (in a state of 
inertia and decline), because from the time that Ghazali recognized Avicenna as a citizen of 
Islam we have clung to the Avicennan tradition. The Europeans, by contrast, stepped into the 
history we had stepped away from, for they knew to appropriate Averroes and proceed along 
the Averroistic path until the present day” (al-Jabri 1996, 135; my translation)  
15 Looking at the economy as a phenomenon embedded in its social container, the Laffer 
curve shows that there exists a point beyond which higher taxation will bring in not greater 
but lesser revenue. Writes the economist for whom the curve is named: “The Laffer Curve, by 
the way, was not invented by me. For example, Ibn Khaldun, a 14th century Muslim 
philosopher, wrote in his work The Muqaddimah: ‘It should be known that at the beginning of 
the dynasty, taxation yields a large revenue from small assessments. At the end of the 
dynasty, taxation yields a small revenue from large assessments’” (Laffer 2004, 1–2). 
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on which an insistent emphasis is placed by the most vociferous fringes of 
Islam (see Verza 2013), as well as by many in the West: On the contrary, this 
fact shows that the two cultures are bound by close ties that grow out of 
common roots. 
But in the second place, and even more importantly, his theory should 
matter to us because I believe it can help us understand what is happening in 
our civilization today, and what point we are now crossing in the arc of its 
development. 
I will claim that, given the universal content of Ibn Khaldun’s thinking, his 
theory really deserves to be integrated into the toolkit of the sociological and 
philosophical theories that are part of the history of the universal political-
legal thought. And, especially, I will claim that his theory can also be fruitfully 
applied today—an application that I will myself explore after its brief 
exposition. 
Indeed, as I will be claiming, the ancient but still extraordinarily valid 
paradigm he built—once abstracted from the 14th-century Maghrebin context 
in which it was developed (and steering clear of any anachronism)16—shows a 
fecund and revealing possibility of universal applicability, and can quite 
usefully be brought to bear on the current political moment in our history 
(see, e.g., Aubert 2016, 54). 
In fact, long before Durkheim,17 Ibn Khaldun identified as the main binding 
core of a political society the sense of solidarity built on the culture of group 
membership (a sense rooted in bonds that in the simplest groups take the 
form of family and kinship ties, but that in larger groups is anchored to the 
 
 
16 It bears mentioning in this regard that Khaldunian studies have come in two “waves.” The 
first of these was marked by an enthusiastic embrace of Khaldun as an anticipator of ideas 
worked out much later in the West. The second wave, still current, instead started out in the 
1930s through a series of analyses (among which Croce 1932), but an even greater impetus 
came from a “colloquium” on Ibn Khaldun held in Rabat in 1979. In contrast to the first wave, 
the second one is marked by a rigid insistence on the “philological” need to contextualize 
Khaldun’s work (see Forte 2005, 182–6). Regrettably, this philological contextualization is 
curiously often understood to preclude any new application of his thought. However, while 
there is no doubt that any author’s thought needs to be set in its time and place if it is to be 
properly understood—all the more so when dealing with theories of society, thus including 
those of Aristotle, Marx, Weber, and so on—this philological focus came down on Khaldunian 
thought with a singular “sterilizing” force that has hardly been applied to any other 
sociologist or social scientist. So much is this the case that the approaches shaping the two 
historical waves just outlined in reality seem to act as mirrors held up to their own 
proponents, revealing much more about the exegetes themselves and their cultural frame of 
mind than about the thinkers being interpreted, or about any inherent limits barring the 
applicability of their theories and theses. So, for example, in different readings of Khaldun we 
can detect the influence of colonial policy; or we can see the West’s need for self-legitimation 
at a time, in the mid-18th century, when it was discovering sociology; or again, more 
recently, we can see the push to Islamize education through initiatives like those of Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr and Ismail al-Faruqi (see Alatas 2014, 58–62). 
17 Émile Durkheim was actually fully aware of Ibn Khaldun’s theory of solidarity/asabiyya, so 
much so that, together with the orientalist Paul Casanova, he tutored a Ph.D. thesis on Ibn 
Khakdun assigned to his pupil Taha Hussein. Durkheim died one year before the thesis was 
to be discussed. 
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main sets of shared political and legal values on which the political contract 
rests).  
I will suggest that this theory offers an important tool for interpreting the 
legal-political developments that have taken place over the last twenty-five 
years. Indeed, this last quarter century saw a paradigm shift in dealing legally 
and politically with diversity: From a model that conflated justice with 
neutrality (a neutrality still understood within a liberal-democratic frame),18 a 
transition took place that brought in a different multicultural model premised 
on the principle that due recognition should be accorded to all different 
cultural traditions. This latter model was introduced in 1992 with two seminal 
works by Charles Taylor (1992) and Joseph Raz (1995),19 and then it 
flourished in both practice and theory: It became policy in the liberal West 
(the United States, Canada, and Europe), and theoretically it flourished as a 
rich, self-standing stream in the panorama of contemporary political-legal 
thought.20 
I think that such an exploration of a possible application to the current 
political climate of a theoretical system produced in another culture, such as 
Ibn Khaldun’s, would in itself instantiate a multicultural enterprise in its 
highest sense: Beyond the current tendency to reduce multiculturalism to an 
exercise in the inclusion of “other” cultures as an “object” of scientific study, 
this exploration would instead endeavour to take from that same culture its 
own point of view as a lens through which to understand our own world, 
thereby embodying the very theoretical perspective of the “other” as a 
viewing subject, as an epistemological tool. 
By doing so, we could discover that this original perspective could offer an 
enlightening contribution to the debate on the limits and conditions of 
multiculturalism. This light could usefully be cast in particular on our own 
time to illuminate the likely trajectory (an axiological trajectory, as well as 
political, economic, and historical) that our society is taking through its 
current (and almost self-complacent) disaffection with its own moral, cultural, 
religious, and political values.  
The hope is that, through such an ancient/modern investigation, we could 
find a way to discern the trends that are shaping our world, in such a way as 
to spot the mistakes we might be making, and to identify the courses that may 
be found (if at all) in steering toward a safer management of society. 
 
 





18 Of course, the main paradigm I am referring to here is given by John Rawls’s theories as 
expounded Rawls 1999 and 2005. 
19 An extended version of a talk that Raz gave in Leiden in October 1992. 
20 The literature on multiculturalism is now quite extensive, and though we cannot offer a 
survey here, a few milestones in this debate can be highlighted apart from Raz and Taylor. 
These include Benhabib 2002; Kymlicka 1995; Malik 2015; Okin 1999; Parekh 2002; and 
Phillips 2009. 
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Only in a dedicated monograph would it be possible to provide an exposition 
that completely covers Ibn Khaldun’s “entirely original science” (Ibn Khaldun 
1958, vol. 1, Preliminary Remarks, p. 78), bringing out its full richness and the 
gamut of its nuances and implications (and no doubt such an exposition would 
be very much worthwhile). 
In this paper, then, we will be focusing on only some of the most significant 
implications of his thought in view of the use I want to make of his perspective 
in relation to present-day culture. 
 
 
3.1. The Spiraliform Cycle of History 
 
Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah is a theory of depth and perspective, and it would 
be mistaken, in my view, to strain to box it into a single labelled container, 
highlighting only his work as a “gatherer” of useful historical and empirical 
data (thus pigeonholing him under a sociological label),21 or only highlighting 
the theory’s philosophical import,22 ascribable to what, according to many, is 
the para-Aristotelian mould into which is cast his cyclical vision of the life of 
societies.23 For in this way we would fail to appreciate the wealth and depth 
that comes precisely from the continuous and mutual feedback through which 
both of these dimensions take shape. Then, too, this mutual feedback unfolds 
on a broader scale. For it can be appreciated not only in the back-and-forth 
between the sociological and the philosophical dimension but also in relation 
to the third way in which the Muqaddimah is set up, namely, as a work of 
history, and a history conceived in the modern sense, that is, with an eye to 
investigating civilizations as cultural entities, too, where societies, in a 
completely innovative way, are conceived as sui generis units of study, each 
shaped by dynamics of its own. 
The theses on the dynamics of the political history that Ibn Khaldun has 
handed down to us in his work reconstruct the complex game of intersecting 
political forces that by turns come to power, in accordance with a spiraliform 
scheme looking to which we can try to infer general (and in this sense 
universalizable) laws on the functioning of civilization, which is a broader and 
more complex entity than society, encompassing not only the population but 
also its symbolic and cultural universe. 
The history of this new collective entity, namely, civilizations, is driven by 
laws allowing for the possibility of predictive accounts, just like the laws that 
govern the natural world, and it proceeds along a course set in an ever-
renewing scheme consisting of three phases: 
- We start out in a specific “backward” environment at the margins of 
civilization (an environment that in the time and place in which Ibn Khaldun is 
 
 
21 See, for example, Alatas 2014; Baali 1988; Dhaouadi 2011; Faridah 2006, 1–23; Megherbi 
1971; Soyer 2010; and Soyer and Gilbert 2012. 
22 See, among many others, Bouthoul 1930; Dale 2015; Hussain 1918; and Mahdi 1957. 
23 On Ibn Khaldun’s Aristotelianism see, for example, Bouthoul 1930; Cheddadi 2006; Dale 
2015; Mahdi 1957; Pomian 2006; and Turroni 2002. 
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writing was defined by the ideal type of the badawa).24 In this environment, 
social groups begin to form that live in a subsistence economy and whose 
culture is comparatively unrefined. Even so, the members of these groups 
share a sense of cohesion and pride; they are a mettlesome lot and do not 
perceive themselves to be (nor are they) subject to the rule of a sovereign; 
rather, they feel bound by the pride they take in supporting a natural leader, 
someone chosen from their own ranks whom they elevate to the status of first 
among equals (primus inter pares), one who is seen as a “champion” of their 
group and embodies the virtues and values cherished by the group. 
- Having built up “fortitude” and cohesion (a concept referred to as 
asabiyya),25 and having thus become predisposed to pursue individual glory as 
well as the glory of the group, even at the cost of sacrificing oneself—all 
virtues nurtured in the unforgiving desert environment—a close-knit group 
manages to take down the previous dynasty and conquer and build the city. In 
the urban area (hadara) that has been taken over, power consolidates into the 
hands of a leader; at the same time the arts and sciences find the ground on 
which to gradually flourish. 
- In the third phase, however—in virtue of a number of factors that include 
the individualistic atomism attendant on urbanization; the mutual dependence 
resulting from an increased division of labour (a description that feels like we 
are reading Adam Smith: Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. 1, chap. 5; Smith [1776] 
2008); the inevitably corrupting effect of power (as evidenced by an 
unreasonable increase in taxes, which in any event cannot sustain the level of 
public spending);26 an accustomation to luxury that becomes compulsive (Ibn 
Khaldun 1958, vol. 1, chaps. 11–12); and above all a progressive, albeit 
predictable, detachment from the group’s own foundational values—the social 
group as a collective entity becomes depleted of its own vitality and so loses 
its abilities and control. This, in turn, will set the stage for another conquest 
by other social groups, newer and more cohesive, that once more will be 
emerging out of the badawa. 
In this third phase, the civilization expressed by the social group enters into 
senility—a debilitating condition where the once-strong cohesion comes apart 
and the pristine virtues are lost—thus paving the way for emergent groups to 
sweep in, prodded by the poverty of the badawa and eager to establish a place 
for themselves in the comfort and security of the hadara. 
However, history will repeat itself once more along the same lines, because 
the nascent power—having found strength and common cause in the very 
privations from which it emerged, and prompted by that same condition to 
 
 
24 The term is tied to a triliteral root that stands for the desert and its inhabitants, which is to 
say the Bedouins. 
25 The word asabiyya derives from the Arab root Arab’ayin, sa, ba, which is common to a 
number of related verbs designating actions such as tying, swathing, and fastening, as well as 
joining ranks with someone, supporting them, rooting for them, and fanaticizing. The same 
root also accounts for nouns that can be translated as “nerve” and “nervousness”; “tendon,” 
“league,” “association,” “collegiality,” and “group spirit” (asabiyya itself); “bandage” and 
“band”; and “zealousness,” “fanaticism,” and “intolerance”; as well as for adjectives that 
translate to “neurotic,” “intolerant,” “fanatic,” and “partisan.” See Baldissera 2006. 
26 For a recent editorial on the Laffer curve, see Orsi, Raggi, and Turrino 2013. 
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seek power and comfort—will itself lose its compass once that objective is 
achieved. Hence, precisely in virtue of its acquired amenity, it will slide into a 
corruptive process destined to take it down, causing it, in turn, to succumb to 
a new group from the badawa. 
The only element that in this cyclical pattern of advances and retreats 
suggests the possibility of taking a course of continuous linear progress is 
culture. For this reason subsequent cycles of civilization will almost never 
start anew from scratch. That is because culture does not necessarily wither 
away along with the human groups that have caused it to flourish, but can be 
passed onto the next generation. And indeed it is normally appropriated, this 
in accordance with a mimetic principle whereby the more backward cultures, 
coming out of the subsistence world of the badawa, and seeking the power 
gained by the civilizations that have managed to move into and take over the 
hadara (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. 1, chap. 3, sec. 13), will imitate what the latter 
in that process have established as the dominant or winning model (ibid., 
chap. 2, sec. 22). 
And, as Ibn Khaldun implies and maybe hopes will happen, among the 
sciences that will have a chance at surviving the changes there will also be his 
own “new science”—a rational and empirical science, with a “multilayered” 
and composite structure, that can be put to use in coming up with an 
enlightening or “educative” interpretation making it possible to uncover the 
“inner meaning” (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. 1, Foreword, p. 6) of social dynamics. 
This science is also “original” in its endeavour to bring to light the 
instructive lesson (‘ibar) ensconced in history and give it a new interpretation, 
a kind of account that—in contrast to the fanciful, self-praising narrative 
rhythmically set in the predefined rigidified canons of the taqlid (traditional 
rules) and designed to exalt the sovereigns, dynasties, and ruling houses of the 
moment (amounting to a literary form rather than a science)—indeed offers 
itself as a rational interpretation of the past;27 a close, accurate record of the 




3.2. The Asabiyya as Engine of the History of Civilizations 
 
In the picture just outlined, as we have seen, society is conceived by Ibn 
Khaldun as a complex system in which multiple factors (economic, political, 
cultural, religious, familial, and so on) come together and interact in such a 
way as to shape the unfolding of history. 
But even though these factors act concurrently in bringing about this 
outcome, there is one factor in particular that plays a key role. For him, the 
true driver of history—the dynamic element that more than any other can 
 
 
27 Indeed, as Abdallah Laroui (1999, 144 n. 11) points out, distinct from any rigidly rule-
bound narrative that draws meaning from itself, historical explanation (in classic Arab 
historiography, the khabar is understood to be at once an event and a recounting of external 
events) requires a correspondence to events, meaning that the historizing needs to be 
verified. 
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account for the cyclical dialectic of the events making up the history of 
civilizations—lies in the asabiyya. 
Ibn Khaldun’s keen analysis of the solidarist concept of asabiyya perhaps 
owes many of its underlying insights to the very horizon out of which they 
were understood by him to emerge at the time he was writing, in 1377. 
Indeed, Ibn Khaldun was steeped in the tribal, “patchwork” reality of the 
desert in the Berber stronghold of Ibn Salama (near Oran),28 where he 
managed bring into focus a factor of social aggregation whose critical role, by 
contrast, would elude European thought for a long time to come, so 
concentrated as this thought was on developing the classic but strict (tertium 
non datur) dichotomy of natural law that, from Hobbes ([1651] 1985) onward, 
forced a binary alternative between, on the one hand, a totally abstract state 
of nature (a state of disaggregation) and, on the other, a state of associative 
life governed by a form of justified power voluntarily conferred on the 
sovereign in virtue of the benefits that this state of affairs would bring to its 
rational subjects. 
Ibn Khaldun takes a different course. For he does not just theorize about 
political power (or what in his lexicon is termed mulk): He also observes it, 
pointing out that not only does it not exhaust, on its own, the list of the 
sources of social cohesion, but that it belongs to only one of the two phases in 
the cycle of a civilization—the more advanced of the two, but also the weaker 
one. 
Indeed, the “imperative” phase of the mulk is set up—and in fact 
dialectically produced—by the development and transformation of the 
“attractive” form of cohesion that characterizes the previous stage. And, 
crucially, this preceding phase constitutes not an imaginary, asocial state of 
nature, but a form of sociality itself—indeed a mightily powerful one, capable 
of engendering a sense of unity among the people much stronger than the 
cohesion induced by political power (here contextualized by Ibn Khaldun in 
his time- and place-relative form of the dawlah, the dynasty). 
This is the state of the asabiyya: a “concrete” and nonstratified social form 
organized according to a hierarchy of nobility and virtue that does not reflect 
any coercive power but rather expresses the group’s own unity and espousal 
of values.29 The asabiyya that forms in the badawa connects individuals 
through a kind of group membership which is not “imposed” but rather felt as 
 
 
28 From Ibn Khaldun’s autobiography, or tarif, we know that it took him five months to 
complete his masterwork. The autobiography has been translated into French: Khaldun 
2002. 
29 It is true that the idea of the asabiyya analysed and narrated in Khaldun’s history finds 
concrete form in the social relations that prevailed in his own time and culture (foremost 
among which was the agnatic and blood relation, even if this relation cannot have any 
cohesive “force” without an underlying narrative), but it would be a mistake to collapse the 
idea into its application—reducing a conceptual tool to one or another of the different forms 
in which it can take on substance at a particular time and place—for that would amount to 
devitalizing it and robbing it of the ability to find any further application, thereby also 
stripping Ibn Khaldun’s thought of its fecundity. This essay accordingly proceeds from the 
view that such pliant use of the idea is not only possible but also desirable (of course taking 
all due historico-sociological precautions and steering clear of anachronisms). 
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valuable. By the same token, individuals in such a state relate to one another 
as “peers,” all equally participating in the collective enterprise, pulled 
together by a shared sense that they make up a whole, united not by fear or by 
a rational pursuit of self-interest, as if in a zero-sum game, but by a proffering 
of reasons that are in large part irrational (here Francesco Gabrieli speaks of a 
feeling of connectedness)30 and grounded in emotion, affection, and 
transport—and yet productive of real consequences. 
Indeed, Ibn Khaldun underscores that the asabiyya (be it familial, tribal, or 
of a different kind) rests not only on a web of concrete, face-to-face 
relationships but also—in good measure—on the power of imagination (Ibn 
Khaldun 1958, vol. 1, chap, 3, sec. 18, p. 374), that is, on a sense of empathetic 
commonality triggered by founding “narratives” capable of forming a 
brotherly bond among people who could otherwise even be strangers to one 
another.31 Indeed, without these imagined ties, even kinship “on paper” alone 
would not form any actual connection. 
When a group is held together by the force of the asabiyya, it will be 
committed to fighting for itself, for its own glory: Its members will have a 
much stronger self-sacrificing devotion to their perceived common cause than 
they would if they formed the rank and file on the bottom rung of a 
pyramidally organized group, in which case they would fight out of a sense of 
duty, or for fear of punishment, or, if they are joining a mercenary army, for 
recompense. 
It is therefore the coalescent force of the asabiyya, especially as influenced 
by a bleak, punishing, deprivative environment, that acts as the original 
wellspring from which the group draws its strength. To be sure, as Ibn 
Khaldun points out, there is never just a single asabiyya at play: At work in a 
large social group will be a number of different loyalties, often overlapping 
and even competing with one another. But the success of a dynasty, of a 
governing force, lies precisely in its ability to layer on top of all these many 
lesser “asabiyyat” a stronger asabiyya—we might venture to call it a super-
asabiyya relative to the former—capable of containing and ultimately unifying 
them. In Ibn Khaldun’s words, “Group feeling is something composite that 
results from (amalgamating) many groups, one of which is stronger than all 
the others” (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. 1, chap. 3, sec. 10, p. 336). 
And among the elements that play a key role in unifying the group, we can 
find that very basic mimetic principle previously discussed that works as a 
catalyst in the process of unifying the multiple asabiyyat into a higher whole: 
In words that seem to anticipate René Girard’s (1961) theory of mimetic 
desire, Ibn Khaldun describes this process as driven by the tendency of the 
“conquered” to be drawn to the winning model and to accordingly imitate the 
customs of the group that has come into power. (Once more, then, it is an ideal 
force of attraction, not a brute one of coercion, that underlies the strongest 
cohesive dynamics.) Again, quoting one of Ibn Khaldun’s headline 
 
 
30 Originally suggestione di colleganza (Gabrieli 1984, 214). 
31 I suppose it would not be too rash to trace to such an analysis the tragically contemporary 
example of “brothers in arms” rallying behind the banner of the “caliphate,” uniting fighters 
from all over the world, no matter how different their backgrounds may be. 
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propositions, “The vanquished always want to imitate the victor in his 
distinctive characteristics, his dress, his occupation, and all his other conditions 
and customs” (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. 1, chap. 2, sec. 22, p. 299). 
The asabiyya, however, in its own turn, gets weakened in the urbanized life 
of a society rationally modelled by the ruling power, especially in the outlying 
parts of the area under control. The more extensive the “nation,” the more its 
sense of unity—its asabiyya—will become diluted. The leader—who, in the 
stage leading to the hadara, as we saw, was supported by the asabiyya of his 
peers—now by natural inclination will be led to concentrate all power in his 
own hands, seeking more and more power, thus giving rise to a deepening rift 
between himself and his peers. 
If, as I would suggest, this crucial passage is reformulated with the help of 
Weber’s ideal types, this is when the passage is effected from the authority of 
the charismatic leader to the (qualitatively different) authority of the ruler 
endowed with coercive force.  
What is more, the ruler’s natural tendency to rationalize control over his 
subjects will prompt him to turn into coercive obligations what have hitherto 
been rules and values the group was espousing as a matter of interior belief. 
This coercive government, or mulk, will thus wind up altering from within the 
mindset, affections, and springs of action that underpin the social life of the 
group as a cohesive unit—a process that in turn will stifle the asabiyya, which 
can only thrive in an environment where it is free to express itself, free of the 
constraints of coercive power. And so there will come a point at which the 
authority of the new ruler will work against the very asabiyya on which basis 
his power was gained, as the logic of an inherently asymmetric power 
contradicts the logic of the shared feeling out of which it grew. 
 
 
3.3. The Downward-Spiralling Phase of the Cycle: The Logic of Power and the 
Dynamic of Desires Lead to Corruption and “Senility” 
 
The key element in Ibn Khaldun’s cycle, as we saw, is the asabiyya, which 
alone can determine and sustain the success of any collective human 
enterprise. But in the unfolding of this narrative lies a deep paradox, for if the 
group’s objective in the political arena consists in getting hold of control and 
power, or mulk, in order to securely exercise it, the very achievement of this 
objective sets the stage for the soon-to-come breakup and demise of group 
itself. 
In many pages rich in detail, Ibn Khaldun (1958, chap. 4, sec. 5) enters into 
what Mohamed Talbi (1973, 79–86) has termed “l’étiologie des déclins,” 
setting out to explain how in establishing a successful political enterprise and 
achieving the much-sought-after urban civilization (the hadara), the group 
reaches a stage that, because of its inner characteristics, will ultimately lead to 
the breakup of its own original sense of group cohesion (a sense of solidarity 
which grows proportionally stronger as the environment puts individuals to 
the test, and which gradually fades away with senility and once luxuries are at 
hand).  
Indeed, in the hadara, individual desires are triggered, the social whole is 
atomized, and the sense of mutual dependence and responsibility on which 
the group’s members had to rely on is worn away. 
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It is precisely in virtue of the luxury and peaceful stability attendant on the 
attainment of civilization that the organic whole winds up collapsing, having 
smothered the asabiyya of society (a virtue which grows out of the need for 
mutual support, and which rests on a bedrock of shared values). Synchronic 
symptoms will come along in the stage of senility: Factors of economic and 
demographic crisis will set in, while the central power, absorbed in its own 
libido dominandi and in the cult of its own image, will have to resist attempts 
to steal its power, especially from the periphery, in the far reaches of its 
sphere of control (ibid.). 
In turn, these signs of decadence will pique the interest and attract the 
aggression of other groups, in a mounting process that will ultimately lead to 
the ruling dynasty being overthrown by the new incoming forces, still crude 
but precisely for that reason propelled by the sweeping élan of the asabiyya 
and charged with that primal, intrinsically ascensive inner tension that 
springs from the grassroots provenance of the badawa. 
As can be appreciated, Ibn Khaldun’s theory merges two elements. On the 
one side, we have what may be properly described as an early sociological 
method, a method developed through the empirical analysis of historical and 
factual details. On the other side, this is coupled with a general, 
universalizable philosophical theory of civilization constructed on the basis of 
those factual data and is checked against them, in an intense internal dialectic 
between the two. If in the Muqaddimah, and in the subsequent volumes of his 
long Kitab, Ibn Khaldun keeps recording and sifting through reliable data from 
different times and different countries, and from different political situations 
within the same countries, it is because he seeks to ultimately arrive at a 
general, universal, and intelligible account, capable of consistently 
encapsulating such data, and finding validation in all of them, even in their 
wide variety. In other words, as Bozarslan writes, there is an interplay, in Ibn 
Khaldun’s work, between “the ‘essential,’ which points to the universal, and 
the ‘accidental,’ revealing the perils of a necessarily complex political 
chronology” (Bozarslan 2014, 12; my translation).32 
It is this “essential” theorization, with the constantly recurring scheme that 
Ibn Khaldun distils from his sociological enterprise, that enables us to claim 
that his theory (like all universalisable philosophies), and the ’ibar (lessons) it 
gives us—however much formulated in a specific context, and more than five 
centuries ago—can still be pertinent and useful as an interpretive tool for a 
dynamic assessment of the state of our civilization, even today. 
 
 
4. The Khaldunian Cycle and Our Civilization 
 
In light of the Khaldunian theory, it is tempting to contend that the changes 
our civilization will go through in the 21st century will be shaped in no small 
 
 
32 The French original: “‘l’‘essentiel,’ qui renvoie à l’universel, et l’‘accidentel,’ relevant des 
aléas d’une chronologie politique nécessairement complexe at aux configurations 
imprévisibles.” 
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part by its asabiyya and by its capacity to stave off and counteract the forces 
that lie behind the downward spiralling vortex of civilizational senility. 
Indeed, if we look at the present day through the lens of a Khaldunian 
sociology, we will see that most of the basic symptoms that Khaldun listed as 
evidence of decadence are afoot: political corruption and the cult of image, 
coupled with social atomization and economic and demographic crisis—all 
signs that seem to clearly foreshadow a phase of senility, a phase that sooner 
or later, on a Khaldunian conception, is bound to set in. 
Ibn Khaldun has taught us that, on the one hand, civilization and culture, 
owing to the force of compactness that enables them to blossom, push in a 
direction that creates windows of opportunity making it possible to gain 
power, dominate the environment, and achieve luxury and security, but at the 
same time this very luxury and security, once gained, will begin to wear away 
at that same compactness by tearing it asunder, thus undermining the very 
foundation on which the group managed to gain its initial strength. 
In very much the same way, the opulent Saturn—the god that in Greek 
mythology symbolizes the age of gold—twirls his mantle around a sickle and 
eats his own children. 
As noted, if at any given time we are to understand the stage at which a 
given socio-cultural conjuncture is positioned, and hence how far off the 
critical point it is likely to be in the cycle of a civilization described by Ibn 
Khaldun as a natural process, we will have to take the asabiyya as the 
benchmark—its strength correlating with the compactness and vitality of 
civilization. When the asabiyya begins to falter, that means that the danger 
threshold has been crossed, and there is no turning back. 
But the asabiyya, which works as the unifying cultural element, is 
characterized, in the West, by a kind of communitarian bond that is singularly 
sui generis. It is indeed a “special” asabiyya, or, going back to the previous 
neologism and setting it within a broader frame, a unifying super-asabiyya 
that, in virtue of the distinctively open values it embraces through its liberal 
and democratic model, is developing with the peculiar goal of also 
accommodating under its umbrella a range of other minority asabiyyat 
grounded in different principles (sometimes even opposite to its own), 
recognizing their otherness in the name of the specific open, liberal, 
democratic nature of its values. Which values are not only constitutionalized, 
but also, at the policy level, enacted, however imperfectly, in the multicultural 
space toward which the Western social world is driving.. 
However, with regard to these distinctive values, the Western society of 
opulence, coupling individualism in the personal sphere with multiculturalism 
in the political, now seems to be finding itself in a deep crisis as far as the 
sense of its internal identity is concerned: As Amartya Sen observed more 
than a decade ago,33 the project of promoting the coexistence of different 
minority groups within the same political space (the nation-state), where each 
group would be recognized and respected in its own protected, distinctive 
cultural identity, having been dissociated from any serious plan for cultural 
 
 
33 Sen 2006a and 2006b. See also, e.g., Touraine 1997; Sartori 2000; Barry 2001; Shachar 
2001; and Malik 2015. 
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integration, has instead in many cases produced a push towards antagonism 
and contraposition. 
Indeed, this society looks weakened from within, in its pride and sense of 
belonging. And this may very well be due to the very abstractness of its 
identitarian contents, which in their present configuration are hardly capable 
of providing its members with a distinctive “communitarian,” reassuring 
embrace and a clear, “thick” measure of their own identity. 
In this regard there are two main signs, it seems, of the degree to which the 
agglutinative fabric of Western society is fraying. 
On the one hand, on an individual level, is the effect of the consumerism 
that has unrelentingly been pounded into us over the last fifty years, with its 
promise of inebriating experiences that ultimately come down to nothing: This 
has made for a splintered society of disconnected consumers sucked into a 
constant push to upgrade their luxury in an unceasing effort to satisfy an ever-
renewing stream of desires.34 
On the other hand, even on the macro level of the basic attitudes inspiring 
policies today, there comes into being a perverse, rupturing effect. This is the 
unintended upshot of a multicultural policy that, to be sure, originated out of a 
noble Kantian ideal of equal respect for the autonomy of each individual,35 yet 
was planted in an ethico-cultural seedbed already bound towards a 
progressive weakening of its cohesive force—an asabiyya, that is, that, in a 
deepening “katabasis,” in its striving to embrace the culture of “the other,” is 
nearing the end of its tether.  
In other words, there is a case to be made that Western society, in its 
support for the value of respect for other cultures and their asabiyyat, which it 
feels bound to catalyse and keep together in a liberal unity, has at the same 
time neglected the need to nourish its own core ethos and culture as a specific, 
substantive standard. As a consequence, it is increasingly struggling to 
coherently ensure its role as a unifying asabiyya. So, unless it does bolster its 
wide inclusionary embrace by subsuming it under the umbrella of a higher, 
unifying solidarity—whose contents (in a somehow perfectionist way) are to 
be found in the very liberal values of tolerance and inclusion by which the 
project is informed—it risks becoming vulnerable and losing its strength. 
At the same time, this multicultural policy is paradoxically also fuelling in 
another way a parallel push toward a splintering loss of social cohesion. 
Indeed, in striving to recognize the different minority groups under its 
umbrella, the multiculturalist effort to label and define these groups, and even 
to protect them from change, has contributed to a rigidification of their 
identity. In this way, these “frozen” group identities have in turn been led to 
oppose one another in an identitarian labelling process that is ultimately 
turning difference into contraposition (see Malik 2013), thus pitting one 
group against another. In a multicultural frame where differences are “put on 
 
 
34 At work here is the phenomenon of human psychology in virtue of which our happiness 
tends to plateau soon after we upscale our material wellbeing, setting in train a ceaseless 
effort to satisfy desires that will never be fulfilled. On this phenomenon see Verza 2015. 
35 I am referring to this ideal specifically as stated in Kant’s 1785 (1998) Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals.. 
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stage” to be asserted, the trans-ethnical boundaries which help to more 
accurately fix and define each group’s identity end up doing so in ways that 
tend to be essentialist and oppositional. 
As we know from the specific dynamics of the asabiyya, however, the high 
vulnerability and potential weakening of the democratic and liberal culture is 
not engendered only by the breadth of its special “hospitability” to other 
cultures. What exposes it to risk is also its spatial expanse. To appreciate as 
much, we need only consider, for example, how the great enlargement of its 
borders to the international (if not globalized) level fails to take into account 
the dynamics of the asabiyya.36 
Indeed, as Ibn Khaldun (1958, vol. 1, chap. 3, sec. 7–8) suggests, there is no 
sliding scale in virtue of which the greater the expansion of a polity’s asabiyya, 
the greater its strength and intensity. On the contrary, the more it grows in 
size, the less will its fabric have holding capacity (ibid., chaps. 4 and 5): As its 
perimeter widens, its internal centripetal strength will fade, prompting 
individuals to retreat into smaller groups to form the bonds and relationships 
needed to lead a meaningful life underpinned by a clear and coherent set of 
reliable values, which the larger group can no longer provide. 
Therefore, on the one hand, on a macro level, there lingers a continental 
European community that is spatially so overstretched and culturally so 
inclusive as to lose sight of its own subjectivity, while on the other hand, on a 
micro level, lies the solitude of the individual, no longer supported and 
validated by the liberal myth of autonomy (see Fineman 2004)—itself 
evidently crumbling, along with the accompanying welfare state. In light of 
this vacuum, it is possible to appreciate how the fascination exerted by a more 
tight-knit form of community can take hold, drawing in the individual with the 
force of its asabiyya—thicker, warmer, and more palpable than this all-
inclusive rendering of the liberal culture—embedding the individual in a 
concrete context of values, certainties, and relationships.37 
But while the group’s dynamics forge and preserve identities under the 
multicultural umbrella, providing assurance and promoting trust within each 
group,38 at the same time they set themselves in potential conflict with the 
 
 
36 As Ed West (2015) points out, a country of five million people is not ten times stronger 
than one of fifty. Its size, like that of a dilating soap bubble, will end up undercutting its 
ability to hold together. 
37 As Farhad Khosrokhavar (2003, 233) argues, the foreign fighters who join the Islamists in 
their treatment of women are driven not so much by hate as by a need to find certainties in 
establishing a solid frame of reference within which to forge their identities and those of 
others. What they are looking for, in other words, is rather a stable order that will put an end 
to the “liquid” vagueness—Zygmunt Bauman’s (2000) liquid modernity—we find ourselves 
navigating as unmoored individuals having to constantly negotiate our identities. 
38 See, in this sense, the idea of trust expounded by Francis Fukuyama (1995), highlighting 
the essential role that trust plays in society in maintaining cohesive bonds among citizens 
and fostering social capital, and ultimately in achieving the wellbeing of society itself. Trust 
is defined by Fukuyama as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, 
honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other 
members of that community” (ibid., 26), in which connection he speaks of “communities of 
shared ethical values” (ibid.). In this sense, the norms being shared are moral norms that, if 
anchored to trust, would enable the community to counteract such practices as clientelism, 
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broader drive toward cultural integration that is supposed to sustain them. 
Yet the unifying background culture should always be able to keep these 
forces of tension in balance, lest it should meet its own demise (with the 
parallel risk, bringing Ibn Khaldun’s lesson to bear, that the same process 
should also fuel the rise of other more bellicose and less tolerant forms of 
asabiyya). 
In short, if an enveloping super-asabiyya is to be able to sustain a 
multicultural universe within, it needs to foster, first and foremost, the 
strength of its own embracing asabiyya: a liberal and welcoming culture, to be 
sure, but a culture which also needs to have a lifeblood and conscious identity 
of its own, otherwise—quoting Arnold Joseph Toynbee, who, not incidentally, 
was a keen interpreter of Ibn Khaldun—the risk is that it will go down a 
slippery slope to its own suicide.39 
 
 
5. Neutrality and Equal Respect: Metaethical Values or Part of the Very 
Content of Western Liberal Ethics? 
 
As we have just seen, the increasing pull exerted by the prospect of a return to 
the dimension of intermediate groups is, in its growth, intersecting with the 
waning force of the higher-order asabiyya—that very liberal, democratic, and 
inclusive culture that was supposed to cut across and transcend all particular 
cultures under its umbrella. 
In fact, over the last half-century, the liberal ethic that was supposed to 
serve as a foundation for this project went through a rapid transformation in 
consequence of which it now seems to have lost sight of its core values, 
turning into an adjudicative metaethic engaged in a constant effort to 
negotiate impartially between the other ethical vantage points and its own, 
and to apply the principle of equal respect and neutrality among cultures to 
such an extreme that it has wound up forsaking its own standing—its own, 
liberal, perfectionistically concrete core of substantive values by which the 
multicultural project itself was initially launched. 
And yet this is precisely the key to understanding the risk of senile 
involution now looming in our cultural horizon. Indeed, as Khaldun’s analysis 
teaches us, the onset of this process comes when the relation among 
individuals who make up a society, and the psychosocial glue provided by 
their specific culture (that is, their culturally determined asabiyya), is no 
longer nurtured and vital. 
Several voices on the political stage today are pointing to immigration, 
globalization, or the crisis of the nation-state as the primary culprit for the 
enfeeblement of the West. 
But as Ibn Khaldun teaches us, the primary reason for the senile decline of 
the West, if this is the path that will be followed, is not to be found in any 
 
 
nepotism, tax evasion, absenteeism, and speeding. Only on the basis of such mutual trust, he 
argues, can humans maintain complex forms of organization that work. 
39 I am referring here to the famous motto apocryphally attributed to Toynbee, “Civilizations 
die from suicide, not murder.”] 
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external factors: not in any excessive extent of the European Union’s borders, 
nor in the unpredictable effects of globalization, nor in immigration, nor in the 
well-intentioned mistakes and unintended consequences of the multicultural 
policies we are pursuing. On a Khaldunian reading, these are all effects of the 
crisis, accompanying us as “travel mates” on a path whose origin, the root 
cause of senescence, lies in the involution in the cycle of the asabiyya—an 
involution owed to the moral implosion of the liberal culture, which is an 
internal implosion owed to the fact that Western society is losing its moral 
compass and sense of self, and the consequent sense of attachment. 
Indeed, a distinctive trait of Western ethics today seems to lie in its having 
turned metaethical, in a vaguely sensed metamorphosis that seems to have 
appeased the old striving of its neutralist project to ascend to a superior point 
of view, self-critically impartial and equidistant from all conceptions of the 
good, “thin” and not “thick,”40 an old striving that has never been set to rest.41 
For while the shift to a multicultural discourse seemed to have academically 
pushed the neutralist project aside, this project never subsided, and in fact is 
being put into effect, dragging along also the self-defeating consequences of its 
hubris: its pretention to (an impossible) superiority. 
This is a project that got underway with John Rawls’s 1971 Theory of Justice 
(Rawls 1999): It became the focus of an intense debate that raged all through 
the 1980s, until the multiculturalist “revolution” broke out in 1992. Its most 
ambitious idea was that it would be possible to reach a maximally detached 
viewpoint from which to objectively adjudicate among the different moral 
views—a view from nowhere, as it has been famously described (Nagel 1986), 
a kind of ascent pulled by a Kantian universalism, advanced as a unique high 
ground that could only be reached through our “superior” liberal moral 
openness. 
In this neutralist endeavour, however, what was once the mainstream 
European culture ended up neutralizing itself, thus dismantling the very basis 
on which this process was supposed to get underway. 
It did so perhaps out of self-conceit, accounting itself to be so far above the 
fray, so strong and superior, that it didn’t have to defend its own ground—an 
attitude analogous to the supererogatory stance of the saint, who understands 
himself to be living by a higher standard of justice and refuses as unavailable 
to himself, on account of this higher standard, concessions that he instead 
believes to be perfectly and understandably allowed to others. Be that as it 
may, in its ambition to “purify” itself from partiality, in a progressive 
recalculation of its own “square root,” in an unrelenting attempt to strike an 
even balance between competing cultures, including its own in this panorama, 
it got caught in an “upsloping slippery slope”: not the value-laden descent that 
entrenches one deep into a concrete culture, but the value-neutral ascent that 
takes one to a position so rarefied and unbiased that it gradually but 
inevitably “vaporizes” into the abstraction of sheer contentlessness. 
 
 
40 The use of this oppositional pair as a tool for describing moral thinking is owed Michael 
Walzer (1994). 
41 As a clear countermelody to my own La neutralità impossibile (Verza 2000), see La 
neutralità necessaria (Del Bò 2014), still supporting this other view of neutrality. 
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Indeed, when a theory committed by definition to tolerance and neutrality 
(like the liberal one) engages a theory committed to the binding force of its 
own content, the latter—for that very reason, and in virtue of the 
combinatorial logic involved—is bound to win out, progressively depriving 
the former of the content it needs for its own nourishment.  
To exemplify, consider the recent burkini controversy on the scope of a 
woman’s freedom to wear what she chooses. If on one side we have the liberal 
stance—committed to the view that women are free to subscribe to any view 
on that matter, and so also to the view that imposes on them an obligation q to 
wear a prescribed list of outfits—while on the other side we have the 
nonliberal stance consisting in precisely that obligation q (whose deontic 
modality by its very nature does not admit of any option other than itself), it 
follows that the only practical solution consistent with both stances is to 
recognize q as obligatory, for this is required by the illiberal stance at the 
same time as it is tolerated by the liberal one (see Taleb 2016). 
In a matchup between a principle of freedom and one of obligation, in other 
words, it is the latter that will almost systematically come out on top. It will do 
so in virtue of its greater determination—as a result of its being clear in its 
content and thick, and bound to socially ensconced customs to which concrete 
cultural meanings are ascribed—for these attributes will overpower the 
rarefied abstractness of any principle of freedom (a principle whose range of 
options includes that of the obligation in question), especially so when 
understood in its contemporary sense as an empty catchall principle 
welcoming of all possibilities—provided only that they be reasonable—rather 
than as a first-level value to be supported in its own right. 
In sum, unless the structural principles of liberalism itself are supported in 
a substantive perfectionist sense in virtue of their content rather than in 
virtue of any assumedly superior neutrality, the meta-contentual, or content-
neutral, logic of tolerance and liberality will always give the upper hand to any 
illiberal stance dialectically opposed to it. 
And yet even freedom and tolerance started out as first-order, content-
bearing (or thick) principles, not at all to be taken for granted. They gradually 
took shape in a long struggle against illiberal systems, and they, too, therefore, 
had to assert themselves as principles of substance against the opposite 
illiberal principles, before fading into the gossamery metaethical hologram 
into which contemporary liberalism has morphed. 
This thinning-out process is clearly illustrated, for example, by the way the 
hard-won freedoms gained by the first- and second-wave women’s movements 
are gradually turning into wallpaper, as it were, no longer being valued with 
due awareness by the newer generations. Indeed, we are now looking at a 
scenario in which, on the one hand, the advances made in the struggle for 
gender equality are taken as political givens,42 and have become part of the 
standard academic syllabus, while on the other hand, in counterpoint to that 
 
 
42 Feminism, as well as multiculturalism, seems to have become a default position one is 
politically expected to subscribe to as a matter of course, at least in academe. But, self-
defeatingly, the very dogmatic and anodyne armour these positions have put on, regardless 
of whether they prove to be fair on the merits, ends up enervating them. 
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development, a “grassroots” culture has sprung up which complacently shies 
away from any identification with feminism (making exception for its flashier, 
but in reality less feminist, manifestations, as in the case of the Femen 
initiative), and which does not in any way seem intent on asserting and 
defending equality for man and woman,43 taking this as an already settled 
matter. 
But as John Stuart Mill warned, “even if the received opinion be not only 
true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously 
and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the 
manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational 
grounds” (Mill [1859] 1991, sec. 2, p. 59). 
Hence, no longer the object of hard-fought struggles, the gains of earlier 
generations have reduced themselves to the status of “metamoral” freedoms 
silhouetted against a background of indifference, and are therefore ready to 
yield to the much more combative and peremptory demands by which they 
are contrasted. 
What we have witnessed, in other words, is a shift—one that has recently 
picked up speed—in virtue of which liberalism has wound up undercutting the 
premises of its own liberal qualities: The strategy of tolerance through which 
these virtues were initially promoted subtly transitioned to a strategy of 
impartiality and “impossible neutrality” (see Verza 2000), and then to a 
politics of multicultural openness interpreted in such a way as to swamp and 
progressively weaken the very liberal foundation on which it stood. For in the 
effort to find a superior lookout point from which to impartially observe the 
political landscape, multicultural liberalism went on a quest for what Thomas 
Nagel would have described a “view from nowhere,” hoping to achieve the 
highest Kantian ambition, only to find itself in a blind spot—a black hole that 
sucks in anyone trying to reach that view and deprives them of substance, a 
condition that seriously hampers society’s cohesion.44 For, as Ibn Khaldun 
teaches us, the keystone and existential condition enabling a social group to 
thrive lies in the cohesive force that unites it under a shared system of values. 
Or, stated otherwise, with Talcott Parsons, what prevents society from 
breaking up is, in the first place, its ability to define the boundaries of its own 
identity—a primal function that Parsons, in his The Social System, called 
latency, performed by the whole of an identifying culture with its values. 
No society, no matter how liberal or welcoming it may be, can exist by 
according equal weight to the multiple cultures it holds within. As Ibn 
Khaldun wrote: “When the elements are combined in equal proportions, no 
mixing can take place. One (element) must be superior to the others, and 
when (it exercises) its superiority over them, mixing occurs. In the same way, 
one of the various [...] group feelings must be superior to all, in order to be 
able to bring them together, to unite them, and to weld them into one group 
 
 
43 In fact, quite on the contrary, the model that seems to grip the young generations, in Italy, 
for example, is that of the so-called veline—the beautiful but totally passive TV showgirls 
whose only role is that of decorative props (see Verza 2014). 
44 Consider the difficult mediations with which the symbolic dilemmas we started from are 
addressed. 
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feeling comprising all the various groups” (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. 1, chap. 3, 
sec. 10, p. 336-337). 
The very existence of a pluralistic society necessarily requires the presence 
of some external framework of general rules and cultural values, which need 
to be widely accepted by the social group itself—there needs to be a belief 
that they are obligatory, from what Hart (1961, chap. 5.2) called an “internal 
point of view”—and such rules and values cannot be neutral, but need 
substantive content.45 
Yet, on the other hand—as the laws and dynamics of the asabiyya tell us—it 
is not possible to fill this ethical vacuum by coercive means. 
The solution favoured by a certain line of trenchantly stern political 
thinking that seeks to authoritatively inject and breathe new life into values 
and cultures through top-down political operations simply cannot work. 
Indeed, as the Khaldunian teaching tells us, if the asabiyya is to be real, it can 
only be so as a spontaneous sentiment shared by willing participants.46 
Otherwise, it would turn into something else and would thus vanish. 
However, as Ibn Khaldun has also taught us, even before Durkheim alighted 
on a similar truth, the asabiyya also feeds on the imagination: While the 
asabiyya cannot be imposed from the outside, it can always be nurtured from 
the inside, especially if society manages to sustain and revive its contents 
before its tradition wanes, enabling people to identify and coalesce around 
them. 
This, after all, is what—in an uptrend running parallel to the downtrend of 
the Western cycle—is already happening in other parts of the world in 
relation to values of an entirely different order: “Asabiyyat” conjured back 
into life from the past (as in the case of Salafism), and “put to market” by an 
appeal to emotion, are gaining much strength owing to the seduction of 
identity they exert, and to their inevitably ascending directionality, thus 
forming devotees ready to even sacrifice their own lives to them. It is 
significant that such conceptions can also entice the children of the liberal 
culture itself, foreign fighters in search of something that can impart meaning 
to their lives (Khosrokhavar 2003, 233)—such is the power of attraction, the 
deep sense of identity, belonging, and purpose they can elicit.  
Clearly, this intersecting march of events, along with its underlying causes, 
is something that must inevitably be reckoned with, sooner rather than later.  
I would submit that the only feasible resource available in giving fresh 
vigour to the liberal asabiyya—thereby re-enlivening the framework of moral 
values our civilization needs if it is to overcome the challenges of time and not 
lapse into the declining phase of its cyclical movement (or at least not yet, 
even though, on Ibn Khaldun’s conception, it is “natural” for this to eventually 
happen)—lies in an educative and cultural effort to achieve integration. And 
 
 
45 This can be described as a super-utopia: While the utopia criticized by Marx was one of 
equality among individuals, what multiculturalism preaches is a utopia of equality among 
groups. 
46 If the asabiyya is coercively enforced by way of obligations, it will wither and die. It will do 
so simply by reason of the enfeebling corrupting process that stifles its vitality from within, 
causing it to collapse. 
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such an effort could only be inspired by the very liberal values of tolerance, 
equal respect and freedom that constitute the axiological basis for a 
multicultural policy. Only in this way, through the gradual, cultural work of 
fostering such a minimal super-asabiyya as the only realistically possible 
common denominator, will it be possible to legitimize the effort to enhance 
the unifying, common heritage of the (substantive) liberal principles making 
up its cultural patrimony, and to do so not coercively (for, as noted, that would 
be extraneous to the very logic of the asabiyya) but by force of attraction, 
bringing out the morally compelling force of liberalism as a common legacy 
that we can all turn to as a basis on which to reproduce an ex pluribus unum 
dynamic and set in motion, even among nonliberal groups, that process of 
mimesis which, as Ibn Khaldun argues (1958, vol. 1, chap. 2, sec. 22), 
characterizes the success of the most integrated polities. 
But this means that the liberal values to be supported should not be 
understood as those of a superior metamorality. For, as we have seen, the 
presumption of rising above all conceptions of the good in a state of content-
independent neutrality is ultimately a self-defeating, self-annihilating 
expression of metaethical arrogance. Instead, liberal values need to be 
cherished in an open and humbly perfectionistic way as the content of a first-
order conception of the good—a democratic and liberal conception—to be 
shared and defended precisely for its substantive import, for its ability to 
compellingly define a specific community and its values.47 
This is to say that the liberal culture—with the tolerance and freedoms it 
embraces—is to be supported, along with its own roots, not out of a pretended 
metaethical superiority it may claim, but precisely because of its content. 
The reasons for the attachment a liberal culture so understood can draw, in 
other words, are to be found in its commitment to values which have been 
strenuously fought for, and which, though constitutionalized, still need to be 
nurtured and protected in themselves if they are to stay with us. Prominent 
among these values are those of equality between the sexes and among all 
persons, the protection of individual liberty, and the flourishing of the 
individual, this according to a notion of autonomy which is not to be 
understood as the solipsistic deprivation triggered by the disintegrating 
consumerism of recent decades, and which does not originate from relational 
solitude, but which draws on the deep humanistic roots of Western culture. 
And it is these very roots that, as Ibn Khaldun teaches, the liberal society 
needs to turn to as the vital source of its own asabiyya if its culture is not to 
wither away, and the society this culture supports is not to fracture. 
As Lenn Evan Goodman has commented, “unless individuals are prepared to 
die for the group, the group itself will die” (Goodman 1999, 215). Only if the 
moral kernel of Western liberalism is sustained—and not as a point of 
neutrality among conceptions of the good, but as a perfectionist ideal itself—
can it infuse vim and vigour back into the Western asabiyya, enabling it to 
provide (within the logical limits set by coherence with its principles) a home 
and habitat for the full range of other particular, minority asabiyyat included 
 
 
47 The essential reading on the foundational ideas of liberal perfectionism is doubtless Raz 
1986. 
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within its sphere, before neutralist liberalism succeeds in completing its self-
destruction. 
But, as we know, a recovery of this kind—a resurgent pull to embrace the 
cultural and moral roots of our civilization—needs to spring from within: It 
needs to proceed in the first place from a civil society which can rekindle its 
own desire to be true to itself, and which can find the strength to assert its 
own partiality—a welcoming society, to be sure, but within the frame of its 
own substantive principles. As things stand, however, a revival of this kind 
seems at best a distant utopia. 
Which is evidence, perhaps, that the senility theorized by Ibn Khaldun—
that point beyond which a civilization loses its will to fight, and perhaps even 
to live—may be about to come, making way for great changes to come. 
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